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ATTACHMENT

1 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM :
Chief, Special Security Center

SUBJECT : Accountability Methods for Microform Copies

1. Attached is a memorandum for your signature requesting that the Security Committee attempt to determine the necessity for having all copies of TOP SECRET and/or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) documents identified by unique copy numbers. The massive proliferation of copies resulting from the use of microform techniques will require new technology for affixing copy numbers if the practice is to be continued. If microform reproductions are not numbered, on the other hand, the requirement for numbering hard copy material is invalidated, to a great extent.

2. This is a serious problem which should have had community attention long before now. It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum.

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CL BY SIGNER

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500180074-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM :

Alternate CIA Member,
DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT : Accountability Requirements for
Microform Reproductions

1. During the past few years, a serious problem has arisen in the Intelligence Community, involving the control of copies of collateral TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information documents produced by microform techniques. I believe this problem warrants consideration by the Security Committee, and requires a decision regarding the need to continue assigning a unique number to each copy of a TS or SCI document. Further, if such numbers are deemed to be necessary, a research and development program will be required to produce an efficient method of affixing numbers to automatically produced copies.

2. At the present time, all collateral TS and SCI documents are serially numbered, and each additional copy is assigned a unique identifying number. The objective is to provide a system of control and accountability, a means of tracing a lost or misappropriated document to a responsible party. The utility of this practice was recently demonstrated when the copy number was helpful in tracing an SCI document, found at [] contractor facility, to the Congressional Committee to which it was charged.

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3. CIA and the Intelligence Community are bound by extant regulations, statutes and executive orders which address the marking of hard copy documents for control purposes. With the advent of the new technology, however, microform is being utilized with increasing frequency. The magnitude of the problem of controlling and marking copies produced by this new medium is difficult to conceive.

4. Within CIA, various offices now control microform in a variety of ways. NPIC and CRS stamp a number on the paper envelope or jacket, and hope the current fiche is returned to the proper jacket. COMSEC uses a Sharpie pen to hand mark each fiche, which is a very cumbersome manual procedure, however, and is adaptable only for a small volume operation. Both COMSEC and NPIC are studying the possibility of using a perforating machine to sequentially number microfiche. This is a semi-automated operation, and its usefulness is limited in that a three or four digit number could obliterate necessary information contained in the title.

5. Other possible control methods would require research and development. These are:

- a. automate through duplication of LED numbers;
- b. use permanent stick on numbers;
- c. permanently stick on a transparent strip behind the title with a perforated number punched thereon; and
- d. use printed large colored numbers.

6. Microform document storage methodology is now used extensively in the Agency, particularly in CRS and NPIC. This trend of increasing use of microform will continue, because this medium reduces storage space requirements, is less expensive and provides an automated retrieval capability. For example, the Office of Security is being tasked by CRS to offer security guidance to the Automated Document Storage and Retrieval (ADSTAR) system. ADSTAR is projected to succeed the present hard copy storage methods with microform and will

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eventually support the SAFE program. ADSTAR, initially planned to support 50 remote computer display terminals, has a projected capacity for 2000 terminals. It is expected to generate a large volume of microform in addition to hard copy, all of which should be identified for control and accountability purposes. The implications of this transformation from hardcopy to microform are staggering, in terms of attempting to provide the required unique copy numbers, not only to microfiche film, but also to any hardcopy reproductions produced by the system. Currently, CRS alone stores ten million documents (approximately 80 million pages). These documents will be converted to microfilm and the capability will be available to reproduce microform copies.

7. To date, the Office of Security position has been that all copies of documents and copies of copies must each be controlled and accounted for by some unique identifier. The problem of the original microform or that which is used to produce additional microform copies, has been resolved. All of the desired markings are now included in the header portion of the media. The aforementioned policy has generated some resistance both in the CIA and the Intelligence Community as being too cumbersome a manual process for marking the volume of copies produced now and anticipated in the future. Certain microform processes have the capability of producing 1500 hard copy reproductions per hour. The additional time consumed in manually affixing copy numbers would multiply this production rate by an unknown factor, but five times may be a reasonable estimate. The benefits of automation, then, would seem to be counteracted by the security requirement, unless new, more efficient ways to number documents can be found.

8. The question, it appears, is whether or not markings for control and accountability purposes are feasible within the constraints of budgetary considerations and manpower resources. It is believed that no conclusive study has been conducted by the Intelligence Community to determine if control and marking can be maintained for microform.

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9. It is requested that this question be accepted by SECOM for immediate study and evaluation. If it is determined that these controls are desired and necessary it is recommended that a research and development effort be mutually funded by all members of the Intelligence Community to develop and produce the technology required to affix copy numbers (or other unique identifiers) to TOP SECRET and SCI materials produced by microform techniques.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) DCID 1/xx "Uniform Procedures for Administrative Handling and Accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)"

FROM:

PPG 4E-70

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 30 Sep 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

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AC/PPG

30 Sep 77

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ADD/P&M

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Registry

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